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We focus on the effects of status loss on decisions 
to participate in subsequent contests in online coding 
platform. We advance the relevant literature in 
several ways. First, by considering the effects of 
status loss on resource expenditure, we depart from 
the prior status literature, which has predominantly 
looked at performance implications of the status loss. 
Second, because of the voluntary nature of online 
contests, we demonstrate how the effects of status 
loss manifest when permanent exit or abstention is 
possible. This aspect marks another departure from 
situations common to the prior work, wherein work 
demands persist regardless of status changes. Lastly, 
recognizing that status changes may be endogenous 
to one's past resource expenditure, we study 
exogenous variation in status, exploiting a natural 
experiment wherein status assignments were adjusted 
overnight by the platform operator, in a manner 
completely independent of individuals' prior 
activities, resulting in sudden loss of status. 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Since Merton's seminal paper [1], management 
scholars have extensively studied the effects of 
status, which often manifests as an “ordering or 
ranking in a social system” [2; p. 284]. Prior studies 
collectively suggest that holding high status is 
desirable because individuals who possess such status 
can reap significantly more economic and social 
benefits than those who do not [3]. However, an 
individual's status is not permanent. Status may be 
lost because of a variety of reasons. For example, 
prior work has explored situations in which status 
was lost because of a public scandal involving a high-
status individual [4], as well as when a person faces a 
loss of favorable endorsement from a third-party 
agency [5]. Regardless of why it occurs, the status 
loss can significantly alter individuals' behavior [6]. 
We build on this prior literature by studying the 
behavioral implications of status loss, resulting from 
the reordering of the status-defining categories at a 
platform for online software coding contests. In so 
doing, our work responds to recent calls for 
examining how people behave after losing status [7; 
p. 225]. 
Extant literature is mostly restricted to explaining 
the effect of status loss on an individual’s or 
organization’s performance in employment or the 
market. With limited exception involving short 
duration project teams involving students [8; p. 341], 
prior work suggests that losing status leads to poorer 
performance. [7] find that status loss results in 
inconsistencies between status and the individual's 
self-evaluation, resulting in ‘self-threat’. Similarly, 
[6] find that the threat of status loss makes 
individuals conform to norms, reducing their 
creativity (p. 595). Studies also suggest, albeit 
inconsistently, that the effect of status loss is uneven 
across individuals. Some studies suggest that 
individuals who bore higher status prior to the loss 
exhibit a more severe drop in performance [7], while 
others argue that the effect is more pronounced for 
those who possess intermediate status [6] 
Our study contributes to the prior body of work in 
several ways. First, instead of focusing upon 
performance changes deriving from status loss, we 
consider the affected individual’s intermediate 
behavioral response by observing their resource 
expenditure. For an individual, spending scarce 
resources is a far more deliberate action than 
performance, for which there are several "potential 
impediments outside the control of the individual" [9; 
p.990]. Thus, from a behavioral standpoint, studying 
the impact of status loss on resource expenditure is 
substantially more meaningful, potentially yielding 
more actionable managerial and policy implications. 
Second, we relax an important boundary condition 
pertaining to the effect of status loss. A common 
consideration in most prior work on status loss is that 
"work demands do not stop after losing status" [7; p. 
255]. However, there are numerous settings in which 
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this is not the case, with voluntary, unpaid work 
being the most obvious example. Hence, our focus 
upon online software coding contests, wherein 
participation is entirely voluntary. In this setting, 
individuals retain a near-complete autonomy in 
deciding their course of action after a status loss. Our 
study thus provides an empirical test of theoretical 
predictions of status loss in a qualitatively different 
context [10], wherein behavioral responses are not 
constrained by the demands of gainful employment. 
Lastly, exploiting a natural experiment, in the form of 
an exogenous shock to an established status 
hierarchy, we are able to tease out the effects of 
status loss, isolating them from any endogenous 
association between naturally occurring status loss 
and subsequent resource expenditure and 
performance. Thus, we are able to overcome the 
persistent issue of endogeneity between the symbolic 
effect of status and the actual underlying quality [11]. 
Our study context is CodeForces.com, an online 
platform that hosts software programming contests. 
The platform categorizes users into nine mutually 
exclusive classes, based on metrics of individuals' 
past contest performance. For instance, the lowest 
group is referred to as Newbie and the highest as an 
International Grandmaster. This categorization 
creates tiers in the participant pool, demarcating 
status. Typically, in online contest platforms, 
individuals who are placed in higher categories, 
attract greater prestige, admiration from fellow 
developers, and even signal expertise to potential 
recruiters. In October 2015, the platform restructured 
the classification scheme, exogenously reassigning 
some individuals to a lower category, independent of 
any changes in their resource expenditure or 
performance. We leverage this natural experiment to 
identify the effects of status loss. Estimating a 
Difference-In-Differences (DID) specification with 
the contest and user fixed effects, we find that status 
loss leads to an approximate 70% increase in a user’s 
subsequent resource expenditure. 
Our findings indicate that arbitrarily status loss 
induces individuals to attempt to reacquire it. Thus, 
while prior work shows that performance outcomes 
may deteriorate after the status loss [6], we find 
evidence to the contrary; that resource expenditure 
spikes in response. As noted above, our contradictory 
results are likely attributable to some combination of 
our unique identification of the effects, and the 
voluntary nature of resource expenditure in our study 
context.  
 
2. Background Literature 
 
2.1 Status and Status Seeking 
 
Status is defined as “one's relative standing in a 
social hierarchy as determined by respect, deference 
and social influence” [12; p. 281]. The concept has 
attracted considerable research attention across a 
number of settings, dealing with work in both 
collective [13] and competitive tasks [2, 14]. Existing 
work shows that individuals actively seek high status 
because it provides "access to power and resources, 
and therefore is pursued consciously in many 
situations" [15; p. 105]. More importantly, studies 
consistently show that behavior is driven by status-
seeking, although there is some disagreement as to 
whether attaining high status itself is the end goal 
[15], or whether individuals strive for high status in 
order to achieve other outcomes [16]. Some instances 
of status-seeking behavior include product purchase 
decisions [17] and participation in online 
communities [18, 19]. 
 
2.2 Performance Implications of Status Loss 
 
Although individuals seek status through 
concerted efforts, the hazard of losing status is ever 
present [4], and individuals are sensitive to this [20]. 
One can lose status in many ways, ranging from a 
highly publicized scandal to demotion in a job. 
Surprisingly, however, “the literature on status 
processes has largely overlooked the phenomenon of 
status loss” [21, p. 477]. In the emerging yet limited 
body of work to date, the focus has typically been on 
the performance implications of the status loss. [7] 
argue that after a status loss, an individual may 
experience self-threat and as a result, a breakdown of 
the information processing necessary to execute their 
tasks, leading to poorer performance (p. 226).  
Similarly, [5] found that status loss among 
investment brokers, stemming from the creation of 
new analyst ranking categories in an established 
status hierarchy, resulted in weaker response and 
reduced attention from investors, leading to 
performance declines. [6] argued that the threat of 
status loss can force individuals to conform to norms, 
lowering subsequent creative output. 
While these early studies provide encouraging 
results, they also suffer from certain limitations, not 
the least of which relates to the use of market or labor 
performance as the outcome of interest. Performance, 
as conceptualized in the present work on status loss, 
is not solely a product of a focal individual's 
behavioral response to losing his or her status; rather, 
it is a product of that behavioral response, as well as 
the response of other stakeholders in the market, e.g., 
consumer perceptions. This argument is related to the 
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ongoing debate about the view of performance as a 
behavior rather than performance as an outcome. 
While the advocates of the latter view suggest that 
"performance is the result of what has been done", 
proponents of the `performance as a behavior' stance 
argue that "performance is in the doing” [9; p. 990]. 
Thus, to understand a focal actor's own response to 
status loss, it is necessary to consider participation-
based measures. To this end, we deviate from prior 
work by examining the effect of status loss on the 
individual's resource expenditure, rather than his or 
her performance outcomes. 
 
2.3 Behavioral Autonomy after Status Loss 
 
One of the key assumptions in the prior literature 
is that “work demands don’t stop after status loss” [7; 
p. 224]. For example, [21] examine the effect of 
status loss among employees of a French 
multinational. Clearly, the employees are required to 
perform their duties regardless of their status. The 
same can be said about studies involving members of 
the British Parliament [4], and financial investment 
analysts [5]. We argue that the presence of persistent 
work demands limits the behavioral autonomy of 
individuals, and thereby constraints their behavioral 
response to status loss. That is, an employee is 
constrained from simply ceasing their professional 
duties following a status loss, out of a need to 
maintain gainful employment. The degree to which 
that constraint applies will depend on the degree to 
which a given individual is locked into or dependent 
upon their employment. By adopting an online 
contest platform as our empirical setting, we relax 
this constraint. On these types of platforms, resource 
expenditure is generally voluntary. A user can simply 
withdraw from the platform and stop participating if 
they wish, with minimal cost. As such, the greater 
behavioral autonomy that online contest platforms 
afford leaves the door open to extreme behavioral 
responses, ranging from complete withdrawal to 
extremely high resource expenditure. As a result, 
examining the behavioral effects of status loss in 
such settings is potentially quite informative. 
 
2.4 Estimating Causal Effects of Status Loss 
 
Finally, we are also conscious of the endogeneity 
issues that plague the status loss literature. Status is 
often predicated on past performance and resource 
expenditure. Thus, the status loss may very well 
reflect on-going changes in a person's behavior, 
rather than cause those changes. This reverse 
causality creates obvious problems in identifying the 
effect of status changes [11]. As some recent 
empirical evidence on the performance outcomes of 
status changes suggests, accounting for this 
endogeneity can yield drastically different effect 
estimates [22]. In the present work, we overcome this 
challenge while examining the resource expenditure 
response to status loss, by leveraging an exogenous 
shock to the status hierarchy on the platform we 
study. The shock was such that individuals lost status 
suddenly and in a manner independent of their prior 




3.1 Empirical Context  
 
We study the impact of individuals' loss of status 
on subsequent resource expenditure, in an online 
contest setting: http://codeforces.com/. The platform 
hosts regular time-bound competitions in which 
participants can submit multiple solutions, with the 
objective of improving their contest score against a 
pre-defined software scoring algorithm. Based on 
past contest performance, the platform rates 
participants in a manner similar to the well-
established Elo ratings used in chess and other 
competitive sports 
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elo_rating_system).  
 Conceptually, the notions of status and contest 
are compatible because “central to both concepts are 
hierarchical orders and their impact on human 
behavior” [23, p.120]. Moreover, there is growing 
interest in studying status in a variety of offline 
competitive settings [14, 23]. Online contest 
platforms have become quite common in recent years 
[24] and hence provide a novel opportunity to study 
status in a digital competitive space of great practical 
relevance. 
From a behavioral viewpoint, each participant on 
the contest platform faces a two-staged, sequential 
decision: whether to submit to a given contest and 
how many submissions to make. Typically, a 
participant makes multiple submissions. In the 
present study, we model these outcomes. 
 
3.2 Status Hierarchy on CodeForces.com 
 
The platform is highly transparent in its 
assignment of participants to distinct status 
categories. First, based on the participant’s current 
rating, she is assigned to one of two divisions1. A 
participant can submit solutions in contests hosted 
                                                 
1 As of May 2018, subsequent to our data collection period, a third 
division has been introduced. 
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either in their own division or in contests that are 
made open to both divisions. Second, depending on 
the participant’s rating, he or she is assigned to a 
color-coded group, such that across the platform, the 
participant's username is consistently displayed in the 
associated color. Given that a participant is assigned 
to a status category based on her past performance, 
others readily associate her expertise and skill levels 
with the color in which her username appears. Given 
that the color scheme has been in existence since 
November 2011, there has been ample opportunity 
for these colors to become salient markers of the 
participant’s status on CodeForces.com. Moreover, 
anecdotal evidence in the form of discussion thread 
postings in the Codeforces.com user forum suggests 
that users do in fact ascribe status to these color 
coding. As such, our conceptualization of status as 
conveyed through distinct, prominent categories is 
consistent with prior work on status loss [5].  
We collected information on all contests, 
submissions, participants and their time-varying 
characteristics, including ratings and color status, 
through February 2010 to January 2018 using the 
platform's Web application programming interface. 
 
3.2 Model Specification 
 
To empirically examine the role of status changes 
on resource expenditure, we began by analyzing the 
association between naturally occurring changes in 
participants’ color status, i.e., changes deriving from 
historical performance, and participants’ subsequent 
participation and resource expenditure. Of course, 
this relationship is likely subject to endogeneity, as 
described earlier. Most obviously, an individual’s 
relative performance in a contest at time t may 
decline, resulting in a status loss, because of fading 
interest or engagement in the platform. That fading 
interest also drives subsequent further declines in 
resource expenditure and performance, and eventual 
exit from the platform altogether. Intuitively, this 
data-generating process would yield a negatively 
biased estimate of the relationship between status loss 
and subsequent participation and submission 
volumes. As such, this initial, unidentified analysis is 
performed primarily to serve as a point of 
comparison, illustrating the importance of separately 
identifying the effect of changes in status from that of 
changes in performance.  
We construct our panel data set based on a sliding 
window of inclusion, such that a user-contest 
observation was included only if an individual 
submitted to at least one contest in the two weeks 
preceding or following the observation. This was 
done to ensure the user was actively deciding to 
submit or not. 
We estimated multiple regression specifications. 
First, we considered the binary participation decision, 
and thus estimated a Logistic regression and Linear 
Probability Model (LPM), specifying the binary 
indicator of submission to a given contest, t, by a 
given individual, i, Submission (i, t), as a function of 
recent status changes. For any given contest-user 
pair, we respectively define StatusLoss(i, t) and 
StatusGain(i, t) in that observation as an indicator of 
whether the user lost or gained status as a result of his 
or her most recent prior contest participation 
Individual fixed effects and contest fixed effects 
were included to account for the potential 
confounding effects of time-invariant attributes 
associated with users and contests. Equation (1) 
reflects the LPM specification we estimate, which is 
also analogous to the logistic regression model. Here, 
i indexes users and t indexes contests. User fixed 
effects are represented by δi, and contest fixed effects 
by τt. Finally, ε(i, t) is our error term. 
 
Submission(i, t) = δi + τt + StatusLoss(i, t) +  
   StatusGain(i, t) + ε(i, t)   
   Equation (1) 
 
Subsequently, we replaced the dependent variable 
with the count of submissions by individual i to 
contest t. We then repeated the analysis using Poisson 
regression incorporating individual and contest fixed 
effects. 
 
3.3 Recovering the Causal Effect of Status 
Loss 
 
As articulated earlier, status loss stemming from 
the individual’s performance outcomes in a prior 
contest is a function of resource expenditure, and thus 
likely to be endogenous to individual’s subsequent 
participation and resource expenditure in later 
contests. This problem has been a persistent 
empirical challenge in the status literature [11]. To 
address this issue and to obtain the causal effect of 
status loss on subsequent resource expenditure, we 
exploit a natural experiment that resulted from the 
platform’s decision to suddenly alter the existing 
status categories. On the 1st of October, 2015, the 
platform modified its color grouping system 
overnight. Although there were some indications of 
an impending change, the specific details and timing 
were never revealed beforehand. Specifically, the 
color status indicators were changed to incorporate a 
new color group, leading to a change in the 
composition of all groups situated above it in the 
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hierarchy. Figure 3.3a provides the preexisting set of 
categories while Figure 3.3b depicts the status 
categories post the exogenous change. Compared to 
Figure 1, one can notice the change in the Rating 
Range for each category along with 2 new categories 
added in Figure 2 
 
 





Figure 2: Color categories after the shock 
(http://codeforces.com/blog/entry/20638) 
 
Of the 14,060 active users at the time of the 
natural experiment, approximately 7,900 lost their 
status (moved to a lower-ranked color group), and 
another approximately 2,000 were assigned to a 
completely new, ostensibly higher-status color 
(Cyan). The following participant 
postings/comments, taken from the platform 
discussion forum shortly after the change was 
implemented, suggest that individuals who 
experienced a downward shift in their category 
experienced a sense of loss 
(http://codeforces.com/blog/entry/20638) 
 
” Well, I’m feeling kinda empty :-(, but alright, have 
to be purple again” 
 
” I became yellow [Orange] in CF because of the 
revolt of colors. Sad! :(”  
 
” Participated in yesterday’s contest div2 and solved 
problem A– today I am Cyan. Lol. dafaq!” 
 
We focus on the 7,874 participants who saw their 
status reduced. Although the subjects who received a 
new color could be argued to have experienced an 
exogenous increase in their status, this interpretation 
is questionable, because status theory argues that 
status is a product of norms and perceptions 
constructed and reinforced over time [25]. Given the 
overnight introduction of this new status tier, it 
appears unlikely that it would deliver a clear increase 
in status to affected participants.  
Given that the change to the color-coding scheme 
was sudden, and its adjustments were in no way 
implemented as a function of participant performance 
or rating dynamics, it constitutes a clean natural 
experiment, which we leverage to evaluate the causal 
impact of status loss on subsequent participation and 
resource expenditure. Equation (2), which reflects 
our natural experiment estimation, is similar to 
Equation (1), except that the subscripts have been 
modified to reflect a focus on a pair of contests for 
each participant, i, namely the contest immediately 
preceding the change, and that immediately following 
the change. Moreover, the StatusLossExo(i, t) and 
StatusGainExo(i, t) variables, in this case, reflect 
indicators of whether participant i has experienced an 
exogenous shift in his or her color tier, in the present 
period, as a result of the platform change (this 
amounts to the interaction term in our DiD 
specification). Additionally, we replace the vector of 
contest fixed effects with a simple post dummy. 
Value of the dummy variable, Post is 1 in the all the 
observations of the contest that took place 
immediately after the shock. As a result, post dummy 
correlates with contest features. 
 
Submission(i, t) = δi + Postt + StatusLossExo(i, t) +  
      StatusGainExo(i, t) + ε(i, t)  
   Equation (2) 
 
The primary coefficient of interest in this 
regression is that associated with StatusLossExo, the 
difference in differences estimate associated with 
status loss. We include all users, noting that inactive 
users will be unresponsive to the exogenous shock, as 
they will not be aware of it. Accordingly, including 
these individuals in our regression analyses will 
merely make it more difficult for us to detect 
statistically significant effects from the treatment. As 
such, any resulting effects we identify can reasonably 
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be viewed as conservative estimates. Once again, 
after estimating the binary response models, we 
repeat the process employing Poisson regression on 




Data used in our (endogenous) panel regression 
sample is comprised of all individual-contest 
observations that preceded our natural experiment. 
The estimation sample pertaining to our natural 
experiment, in contrast, includes exactly two 
observations per individual; one for the last contest 
the individual could conceivably have submitted to 
prior to the shock, and a second for the next contest 
conducted immediately following the shock. We 
adopt this approach because the effect of status loss 
can be teased out most cleanly by observing the 
immediate contests. If the time window around the 
shock is expanded, the effects are likely to be 
confounded by other unobserved determinants. 
Moreover, we don’t observe any acute deviations 
between the contests that occurred immediately 
before and after the shock, and the rest of the contests 
represented in the dataset. For instance, the contests 
used in the DiD estimation have an average duration 
of 7650 seconds while the average duration of all the 
contests is 7579 seconds.  
Descriptive statistics for our panel regression 
sample are presented in Table 1, and those for our 
natural experiment sample are presented in Table 2. 
Considering the panel data set, in Table 1, we see that 
the average individual-contest pair includes 2.89 
submissions, but that the distribution is highly 
skewed, with a maximum value of 211 submissions 
to a single contest.  
Moreover, even with our sliding window of 
inclusion, based on individuals submitting to at least 
one contest in the two weeks preceding or following 
a contest, we still see that roughly 50% of the 
individual-contest observations involve zero 
submissions. This observation helps justify our 
consideration of both the binary submission decision 
(participation), separate from the count of 
submissions (effort). The status change dummies 
indicate that both events are quite frequent, with 
status loss preceding 29% of individual-contest 
observations, and status gain preceding 17%. 
Considering the Natural Experimental sample, in 
Table 2, we see similar patterns.  
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for contestant-
contest panel  
 
 N Mean Min Max SD 
Submit 
Count 
621,361 2.89 0 211 4.75 
StatusLoss  594,878 0.29 0 1 0.45 
StatusGain 594,878 0.17 0 1 0.38 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics for natural 
experiment 
 
 N Mean Min Max SD 
Submit 
Count 
28,120 0.89 0 47 2.65 
StatusLoss 
Exo 
28,120 0.28 0 1 0.45 
StatusGain 
Exo 




The results of our binary regression models are 
presented in Tables 3 (LPM) and 4 (Logit). Looking 
first to the panel regression results in Table 3, we find 
that loss of status as a result of the last active contest 
participation is associated with a 1.3% increase in the 
probability that an individual submits to a subsequent 
contest. Considering our count model, in the 1st 
column of Table 5, we see a similar result, indicating 
an approximate 2.3% increase in the volume of 
submissions to a subsequent contest, following a 
status loss.   
Recall, however, that these estimations are likely 
to be downward biased because a typical status loss is 
quite likely to be reflective of a pre-existing 
downward trend in an individual’s engagement with 
or interest in the platform. Accordingly, we might 
expect that the effects are more positive. Indeed, this 
is exactly what we observe when we shift focus to the 
results of our natural experiment estimations. The 
observed shift in the effects status loss underscores 
the role of panel data results as a basis of comparison. 
Returning to Table 4, we observe larger 
coefficients in each case. Focusing on the logistic 
regression result, which is arguably the more reliable 
of the two, e.g., given that LPMs do not constrain the 
model to yield predictions in the 0-1 range, we see an 
order of magnitude increase in the estimated 
coefficient on the loss of status. Similarly, in the 
second column of Table 5, we see an estimated 
positive effect of 0.532, showing a 20x increase in 
the estimated coefficient, which translates to a nearly 
70% increase in the rate of contest submission. 
 
Table 3: Status loss effect on the decision to 








StatusLoss 0.013*** (0.001) 0.016+ (0.008) 
StatusGain -0.008*** (0.002) 0.003 (0.011) 
User FE Yes Yes 
Contest FE Yes Yes 
N 592822 28120 
Adj. R2 0.148 0.273 
Cluster robust standard errors reported in the parentheses;  
OLS estimator with two-way fixed effects is used;  
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 







StatusLoss 0.066*** (0.008) 0.646*** (0.098) 
StatusGain -0.042*** (0.009) 0.096 (0.122) 
User FE Yes Yes 
Contest FE Yes Yes 
N 594878 5348 
Cluster robust standard errors reported in the parentheses;  
Logit estimator with two-way fixed effects is used;  
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 







StatusLoss 0.023*** (0.005) 0.532*** (0.071) 
StatusGain -0.028*** (0.005) -0.053  (0.089) 
User FE Yes Yes 
Contest FE Yes Yes 
N 569348 6810 
Cluster robust standard errors reported in the parentheses; 
Poisson estimator with two-way fixed effects is used; + p < 
0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
5. Conclusion  
 
We have presented a novel analysis of status loss 
effects on individuals’ subsequent resource 
expenditure in the context of an online software 
coding contest platform, Codeforces.com. Our work 
departs from the small body of prior work on status 
loss in three ways. First, we consider a context 
involving voluntary, unpaid work, where individuals’ 
responses to status loss are not constrained by 
persistent work demands. That is, individuals have 
the autonomy to reduce their engagement or exit the 
market entirely. Second, we focus on the immediate 
impact upon affected individuals’ resource 
expenditure, rather than changes in performance, 
noting that performance is a downstream outcome 
that results from both affected individuals’ resource 
expenditure, as well as perceptions of other 
stakeholders in the market, e.g., consumers, which 
may also be influenced by the focal actor’s status 
loss. Third, we attend closely to the issue of causal 
identification, exploiting a natural experiment in 
which the platform operator adjusted status markers 
independent of any changes in individuals’ resource 
expenditure or performance. 
We provide evidence that status loss results in 
large increases in affected individuals’ resource 
expenditure. In short, when individuals experience 
exogenous status loss, they respond vigorously by 
attempting to reacquire that status.  
Our findings suggest that the mechanisms behind 
prior findings of performance declines following a 
status loss are either context-dependent or a result of 
negative market perceptions dominating any resource 
expenditure increase on the part of affected workers. 
These findings have important implications for 
practice and policy, as they suggest that the optimal 
approach to managing worker effort in the face of 
status loss should focus not on inducing effort; rather, 
they should focus on managing perceptions. 
 For example, in our setting, market perceptions 
primarily play a role in career search for affected 
contestants. Anecdotal evidence suggests that some 
workers benefit from improved career prospects as a 
result of their success in these contests. Status shifts 
that ignore this may do unnecessary harm to 
contestants if the message to employers is not well 
managed.   
More generally, our findings contribute to the 
literature on the status loss. In large part, this 
contribution arises by raising new questions about the 
nature and mechanisms of status loss effects on 
worker performance. Our findings suggest that 
additional work is needed to tease apart resource 
expenditure from performance outcomes, as a result 
of the status loss, and to understand the moderating 
influence of incentive structures, be they job search, 
financial compensation or intrinsic motivators. 
 This study has several possible extensions, which 
may aid in further uncovering the underlying status-
based mechanisms. First, one may assess whether the 
observed effects of status loss is predicated on the 
solver’s status before the shock. Extant work indeed 
suggests that those with higher prior status respond to 
status loss more strongly than those with lower prior 
status [7] Second, future studies can examine whether 
the exogenous changes in the status also affects the 
quality of the output that users generate. Lastly, one 
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can also examine the length for which the effect of 
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